See the footer if you would like to unsubscribe from the newsletter
Dear Subscriber,
Dear Subscriber,
South East Asia Marine Engineering And Constructions Ltd (Seamec Ltd) vs. Oil India Ltd (Supreme Court)
Doctrine of "Force Majeure" & "Frustration of Contract": Under Indian contract law, the consequences of a force majeure event are provided for u/s 56 of the Contract Act, which states that on the occurrence of an event which renders the performance impossible, the contract becomes void thereafter. When the parties have not provided for what would take place when an event which renders the performance of the contract impossible, then S. 56 of the Contract Act applies. The effect of the doctrine of frustration is that it discharges all the parties from future obligations (Imp judgements referred) From the aforesaid discussion, it can be said that the contract was based on a fixed rate. The party, before entering the tender process, entered the contract after mitigating the risk of such an increase. If the purpose of the tender was to limit the risks of price variations, then the interpretation placed by the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be said to be possible one, as it would completely defeat the explicit wordings and purpose of the contract. There is no gainsaying that there will be price fluctuations which a prudent contractor would have taken into margin, while bidding in the tender. Such price fluctuations cannot be brought under Clause 23 unless specific language points to the inclusion
Decoding The Intricate Lanes Of Section 153C vis-à-vis Section 148
CA Nidhi Surana has explained the subtle differences between an assessment made under section 153C of the Act and that made under section 147/148 of the Act. She has pointed out that the different jurisdictional conditions that have to be satisfied before the AO invokes either of the two provisions. She has also highlighted the different consequences that befall the assessee under the two assessments. All the relevant judgements and Circulars of the CBDT have been referred toConstitutionality Of Section 278E Of The Income-tax Act, 1961
Advocate Sarthak P. Shetty has argued that section 278E of the Income-tax Act, which shifts the burden of proof upon the assessee and provides that an accused is presumed to have a culpabe mental state, is contrary to the basic principles of criminal law and makes serious inroads on the fundamental rights of citizens. He has pointed out that even in the other statutes such as The Prevention of Corruption Act and the NDPS Act, where the burden is shifted to the accused, the accused has to satisfy the Court only on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and not "beyond reasonable doubt". He has also referred to all the leading cases on the subject to support his argument See Also: Digest of case laws (updated regularly) containing latest judgements reported in BCAJ, CTR, DTR, ITD, ITR, ITR (Trib), Chamber's Journal, SOT, Taxman, TTJ, BCAJ, ACAJ, www.itatonline.org and other journals
Taxability Of Rental Income From Let Out Property – A COVID-19 Complexity U/s 23 Of The Income-tax Act, 1961
Advocate Anuj Kisnadwala has raised the interesting and relevant question as to whether, if the landlord gives the tenant a concession in the rent owing to the Covid-19 hardship, he is entitled to claim that he should be taxed only the rent actually received and not on the contracted rent. He has referred to the relevant judgements and also offered valuable guidance on the documentation that the landlord should maintain to be able to argue his case successfully before the authorities__._,_.___
Posted by: "editor@itatonline.org" <itatonline.org@gmail.com>
| Reply via web post | • | Reply to sender | • | Reply to group | • | Start a New Topic | • | Messages in this topic (1) |
.
__,_._,___
0 comments:
Post a Comment